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Abstract. One of the major problems that prevents the spread of elec-
tions with the possibility of remote voting over electronic networks, also
called Internet Voting, is the use of unreliable client platforms, such as
the voter’s computer and the Internet infrastructure connecting it to
the election server. A computer connected to the Internet is exposed to
viruses, worms, Trojans, spyware, malware and other threats that can
compromise the election’s integrity. For instance, it is possible to write
a virus that changes the voter’s vote to a predetermined vote on elec-
tion’s day. Another possible attack is the creation of a fake election web
site where the voter uses a malicious vote program on the web site that
manipulates the voter’s vote (phishing/pharming attack). Such attacks
may not disturb the election protocol, therefore can remain undetected
in the eyes of the election auditors.
We propose the use of CodeVoting to overcome insecurity of the client
platform. CodeVoting consists in creating a secure communication chan-
nel to communicate the voter’s vote between the voter and a trusted
component attached to the voter’s computer. Consequently, no one con-
trolling the voter’s computer can change the his/her’s vote. The trusted
component can then process the vote according to a cryptographic voting
protocol to enable cryptographic veriﬁcation at the server’s side.
Keywords: Remote voting, Internet voting, vote manipulation, uncon-
trolled voting platform, insecure voting platform.
1 Introduction
Remote electronic voting over electronic networks, also called Internet voting,
is very appealing because it oﬀers the possibility of voting from anywhere with
an Internet connection, on election day, avoiding the need to vote in advance.
Therefore, remote Internet voting oﬀers a convenient way to vote for users away
from home on vacations, due to work, or for any other expected or unexpected
reason. However, surprisingly or not, there are not many Internet voting systems
in use today. One of the main reasons for this situation is that a computer
connected to the Internet does not oﬀer a secure voting environment.
D. Chaum et al. (Eds.): Towards Trustworthy Elections, LNCS 6000, pp. 310–329, 2010.
c© IAVOSS/Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010
Improving Remote Voting Security with CodeVoting 311
A computer connected to the Internet is exposed to several threats, such
as viruses, worms and Trojans, among others. These threats take advantage of
vulnerabilities in software to perform malicious actions, including taking control
of the computer. The number of new vulnerabilities reported is too high to be
ignored, 8064 in 2006 and 5568 in the ﬁrst three quarters of 2007 [1,2]. It is easy
to imagine a virus exploring one of those vulnerabilities to steal or change the
voter’s vote.
It is also possible, in some situations, to steal the voter’s vote without at-
tacking the voter’s computer. An attack to the Internet support infrastructure
could send the voter to a fake election web site. Once in the fake election web
site the attacker could use the voter’s authentication information and steal the
voter’s vote. Such type of attack is called pharming [3]. An example of an attack
technique against home routers can be found in [4]. Reports on recent pharming
attacks against banks in the US, Europe and Asia-Paciﬁc can be found in [5,6].
Another important issue concerning remote voting in general is that there
are no guarantees that the voter will vote alone. Therefore, the voter may be
subject to coercion. A special case of coercion within family members that live
in the same house, named family voting, has been observed in several countries
[7] and is a problem to consider whenever remote voting is allowed, e.g. postal
voting, Internet voting. A problem that is somehow similar to coercion is vote
selling. Since the voters cast votes in an uncontrolled environment they can give
their ballot to anyone, or vote in the presence of anyone, therefore they may be
tempted to sell their vote. A possible protection against vote selling and coercion
is to allow the voter to update their vote, i.e. cast several votes [8].
The main diﬀerence between traditional remote voting, e.g. postal voting,
and Internet voting is that Internet voting attacks are able to target a large
number of voters with a fraction of the budget. Our opinion is that an attack to
steal/change the voter’s vote by attacking the voter’s computer or the Internet
infrastructure poses a potentially higher risk to the election’s integrity than an
online vote buying or coercion attack. We base our opinion on the following four
reasons:
– First, large scale vote buying/coercion, involving possibly thousands of vot-
ers, is quite unlikely to pass undetected. Additionally, vote buying/coercion
can be discouraged by allowing vote updates.
– Second, with all the security ﬂaws in operating systems and applications, it
is easy to write a virus that would be active on election day to change the
voter’s vote.
– Third, we believe that writing a virus and disseminating it would be cheaper
and more diﬃcult to trace back to the authors than a vote buying/coercion
attempt of a thousand voters, therefore, more appealing to an attacker.
– Fourth, punishing the attackers would be very diﬃcult, if not impossible,
because the attack could be carried out from anywhere in the world.
Therefore, we can say that the insecure voting platform [9,10,11,12,13], oﬀered
by a computer connected to the Internet, and the possibility of an unpunished
attack are the main issues that prevent the spread of remote Internet voting.
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We propose the use of CodeVoting, a technique to communicate the voter’s
vote between the voter and a trusted component attached to the voter’s com-
puter. Consequently, no one controlling the voter’s computer can change the
vote. CodeVoting oﬀers a manually veriﬁable proof of correct vote fulﬁllment
and submission, based on the assumption about the existence of a trusted and
secure component attached to the voter’s computer. In this paper we present the
CodeVoting technique [14,15] and an enhancement to support large candidate
lists and multiple elections.
1.1 Why Cryptographic Voting Protocols Are Not Enough
In the last 30 years many cryptographic voting protocols were proposed to se-
cure electronic voting. Several cryptographic techniques were employed such as
blind signatures [16,17,18,19], mix-nets [20,21,22,23] and homomorphic ciphers
[24,25,26,27]. However, the main concern of these cryptographic voting protocols
is the protection against vote manipulation at server side, assuming a trusted
client to establish a secure communication channel to the election server and to
perform the cryptographic steps and veriﬁcation of the voting protocol.
It is clear that these cryptographic voting protocols do not work well without
the assumption of a trusted voting client. The CodeVoting’s goal is to provide
the means to secure the use of a cryptographic voting protocol from a generic
computer connected to the Internet.
1.2 CodeVoting Overview
CodeVoting does not replace traditional voting protocols. It works by creating a
secure channel between the user and a trusted component that runs one of the
traditional voting protocols with the voting server (Fig. 1). Therefore, CodeVot-
ing can be considered a kind of user interface for the voting system.
Fig. 1. CodeVoting overview
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We propose the use of a tamper resistant device, such as a smart card, to be
the trusted component of the voting system at the client’s side. Since a smart
card provides a much more secure execution platform than an oﬀ-the-shelf PC,
using CodeVoting to create a secure communication channel to the smart card,
through the voter’s PC, will prevent automatic vote manipulation by malicious
software installed in the voter’s PC. Since we propose the use of a cheap tamper
resistant device, such as a smart card, that does not have network nor I/O
capabilities, the voter’s PC network and I/O capabilities will still be used to
interact with the voter and the server’s side of the voting system.
The use of secure devices, e.g. smart cards, in electronic voting is not a new
concept [28,29]. Secure devices are typically used as a way to provide secure
voter’s authentication and for the generation and secure storage of secret values
for a voting protocol. However, it is always necessary to use the voter’s computer
to show the ballot and collect the answer, and this is usually assumed to be per-
formed by a trusted vote client application. Our goal is to show how one can
build a simple, secure and private communication channel between the voters
and their trusted devices, without the need to trust in the voters’ computers.
Secure communication channels are easy to achieve between machines, e.g. by
sharing a secret key. However, making a secure and private communication chan-
nel between a machine and a human is not so straightforward. The challenge is
to keep the complexity of the communication channel as small as possible in
order for the human to be able to deal with it.
1.3 Vote Manipulation Attacks
A vote manipulation attack can be a modiﬁcation of the voter’s vote. It can be
performed in two ways: i) changing a vote to a predetermined candidate, or ii)
changing a vote to a random candidate. While the ﬁrst attack is more powerful,
the second may be easier to prepare in advance. In other words, to change a vote
to a predetermined candidate one must have the knowledge of which candidate
one wants to change the vote to, while to change the vote to a random candidate
there is no need to know the candidates in advance.
If one wants to increase the number of votes for a candidate A it is preferable
to perform an attack that will directly change the votes to votes for candidate A.
On the other hand, if one wants to decrease the number of votes for a candidate
B, it suﬃces to perform a random vote modiﬁcation attack in an area known to
be more favorable to candidate B.
The other kind of vote manipulation attack is to fake a successful vote delivery.
In many voting systems this can be done by just presenting the message “Your
vote was successfully delivered. Thank you for voting.”. This attack allows an
attacker to reduce the votes on a candidate just by targeting an area with great
aﬃnity for that candidate.
In the next section we describe the currently proposed approaches to minimize
the weaknesses at the client’s side. In section 3 we present the CodeVoting tech-
nique, a solution that prevents vote manipulation at the client’s side by using a
mix of “special security PC hardware” and “code sheet” approaches. We evaluate
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the CodeVoting proposal’s resistance to vote manipulation attacks in section 4.
In section 5 we present the Matrix CodeVoting, a CodeVoting enhancement to
support large candidate lists and multiple elections. Finally, in section 6, we
present the conclusions and future work.
2 Related Work
Cryptographic voting protocols can prevent vote manipulation at server side.
However, that is only relevant if the votes cannot be easily manipulated at the
uncontrolled client side of a remote voting system. Here we present an overview
of the approaches proposed to mitigate the problem of the unreliable vote client
platform [9,30].
2.1 Clean Operating System and Voting Application
This approach assumes the existence of a CD-ROM with a “clean” and certiﬁed
operating system and voting application. The voter should boot her computer
from the CD-ROM to have access to the vote application. One of the major
problems with this approach is how to design such CD-ROM so that it would
allow the voters to boot from any computer in use. Another problem is how
to provide Internet access. Voters have diﬀerent types of Internet connections
at home, such as modem, ADSL, cable. Would the voters have to manually
conﬁgure their connection parameters?
The immediate consequence of such variety of conﬁgurations is that a large
amount of software, besides the operating system and voting application, has to
be on the CD-ROM, and consequently also, has to be veriﬁed. Therefore, some
questions remain: can we claim that a CD-ROM is clean? And to which extent?
Is it clean enough to provide a secure voting platform?
With all these questions/problems pending we do not believe that this ap-
proach could be successfully used to enable secure voting from any computer
with an Internet connection.
2.2 Special Secure Hardware for a PC
This approach assumes a dedicated software-closed security device, with secure
I/O, attached to the voter’s computer, e.g. through a USB port. Its purpose is
to display the ballot to the user, accept the voter’s choices as input, and per-
form cryptographic operations. In eﬀect, the voting protocol is executed by the
secure device. Since the device is software-closed, meaning its software cannot
be changed, it is not subject to infection with a malicious code. The main disad-
vantage of this approach is the cost of such dedicated hardware. Moreover, the
manufacturer and the distribution process of the devices must be fully trusted.
Zu´quete et al. [31] implemented a system based on this concept. They use a
secure smart card terminal with I/O capabilities to display the ballot and read
the voter’s answer. In addition, they use a smart card to provide public key
authentication. The main disadvantage of the system, besides the cost, is the
reduced display capacity of the terminal, which is only 4 lines of 20 characters.
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2.3 Closed Secure Devices
The use of closed secure devices was one of the proposals made by the California
Internet Voting Task Force in 2000 [9]. The proposal was the use of special
software-closed and Internet-capable devices, such as network computers (NCs)
or hand-held, wireless descendants of those days (early 2000s) cell phones and
electronic organizers.
However, modern cell phones and electronic organizers that have Internet
access usually allow the user to install arbitrary applications too. This facility
makes the systems open to malicious applications that take advantage of the
vulnerabilities of the operating system of the device.
Moreover, the use of closed secure devices just to access a web site on the
Internet, through which the voter votes, is vulnerable to attacks to the Internet
infrastructure, such as pharming attacks.
2.4 Secure PC Operating Systems
This approach suggests the use of secure PC operating systems that may be
composed of digitally-signed modules, allowing secure applications to exclude,
as untrusted, modules of dubious origins (i.e. potentially malicious programs).
Trusted computing is the name given to the technology that is being devel-
oped today to oﬀer such secure platform support [32]. Trusted computing is a
technology that allows the remote attestation of machines and programs running
on them. With remote attestation it is possible to certify that a voter is using
a correct voting program. Trusted computing also provides ways to secure I/O
operations between the program and the physical I/O devices, therefore creating
a secure environment for an application to run. The attestation process is based
on measures performed on the software by a hardware module called trusted
platform module (TPM).
The client of a remote voting application needs to interact with the voter
(I/O device drivers), needs to establish a connection with a voting server (net-
work protocol stack + network adapter driver) and, last but not least, it needs
an environment to run on, i.e. a working operating system. The attestation of
the core of the operating system, the device drivers and the voting application
can be cumbersome. Moreover, there are also problems concerning the matu-
rity of the currently deployed technology [33] and concerning the revocation of
cracked machines [34]. We believe that, for the time being, the application of
trusted computing to remote voting as the only guarantee of the correct appli-
cation behavior is not a valid alternative. Nevertheless, there are proposals to
use trusted computing technology to solve the uncontrolled platform problem in
remote voting [35].
2.5 Code Sheets
This approach consists in secretly sending, e.g. by mail, code sheets to voters
that map their choices to entry codes on their ballot. While voting, the voter uses
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the code sheet to know what to type in order to vote for a particular candidate.
In eﬀect, the voter does the vote encryption and, since no malicious software on
the PC has access to the code sheet, it is not able to change a voter’s intentions.
The ﬁrst code sheet implementation we are aware of was proposed in 2001 by
Chaum [36], the SureVote system. SureVote allows the voter to cast a vote using
secret vote and reply codes. SureVote generates secret vote and reply codes for
each candidate and for each voter. The codes are delivered to the voters prior
to the election day. On election day the voter sends the vote code of her/his
favorite candidate through the voting channel, e.g. Internet. At server side, the
reply code is computed by a set of trustees and sent to the voter that conﬁrms it
- in this way it is veriﬁed that there was no vote modiﬁcation. After the election
day the trustees compute the real votes from the vote codes and publish the
results. However, if there is at least one corrupted trustee, SureVote does not
guarantee that in the counting phase the vote code is translated to the right
candidate.
A code sheet system was used in the UK on some pilots of Internet, SMS
and telephone voting [37,38]. A similar system was also proposed by Helbach
and Schwenk [39] in which they suggest the use of a three-way-handshake voting
protocol. They use a third code to conﬁrm the vote.
The main drawback of this approach is the diﬃculty to guarantee that the
codes are secretly generated and anonymously delivered to the voters. Another
drawback is that there is no guarantee that the code vote is translated to the
right candidate at server side, i.e. the reply code only conﬁrms that the vote has
reached an entity that knows the right reply code.
2.6 Test Ballots
This approach requires the use of special test ballots to be sent from clients and
checked by software at the election authorities’ oﬃce. The number, location,
timing, and contents of the test ballots should be known by the county, but they
should be otherwise indistinguishable from real ballots, so that any malicious
code that destroys or changes real ballots will aﬀect the test ballots as well.
The analysis of the test ballots will enable any malicious code attacks to be
detected, the locations of infected machines to be determined, the approximate
time of the attack to be estimated, and the total number of votes aﬀected to be
bounded. Note that this technique does not prevent malicious code attacks; it
only detects them after their occurrence. Hence it must be combined with one
of the previously presented techniques.
Of course, this technique only works if the attack is to be performed after the
vote is produced by the vote client software. The attack will not be noticed if it
just modiﬁes the voter’s option before passing it to the method that processes
the vote and delivers it to the vote server.
Still, this approach can be used as a kind of intrusion detection system that
can detect any systematic cause of lost ballots, not just malicious code attacks,
and provide a quantitative measure of the size of any problem it detects.
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2.7 Obscurity/Complexity
This approach, while not suﬃcient to guarantee the security of the system, raises
the cost for potential attackers. Digital ballot formats and voting software may
be kept secret prior to the election and possibly randomly changed during the
election, or made complex in other ways. In order to successfully carry out an
attack and escape detection, malicious software authors must have a great deal
of information about the internal format of the ballot and voting software. If
these details are not available in advance, and/or if that information is complex,
the potential authors of attack software may not have enough time to develop
and distribute it during the election window.
On the other hand, it is diﬃcult to establish a lower bound to the time needed
to write malicious software. Additionally, the system is still vulnerable to pharm-
ing attacks that collect voters’ authentication data and use them later in the real
voting client software.
2.8 External Channel Verification
This approach consists in having a secondary communication channel to the
election server that would allow the conﬁrmation of the correct vote delivery.
Kutylowski and Zago´rski [40] proposed a voting protocol where a voter uses a
secondary channel ﬁrst to “decrypt” the ballot and choose the candidate, and
then to verify with a probability of 12 that the vote was correctly submitted to the
election server. The main disadvantage of this protocol is the complexity of the
veriﬁcation tasks given to the voter that must deal directly with the encrypted
ballots.
Skagestein et al. [41] proposed the veriﬁcation of the clear casted vote. In their
approach, a voter who wants to verify her/his vote can just use another PC and
ask to see the casted vote. This second PC asks the voting server for the voter’s
vote, opens it with the secret encryption key used to encrypt the vote that should
be stored in a secure medium at the time of vote casting, and displays the vote
to the voter. To minimize the danger of vote selling and coercion, the authors
proposed that the cast of several votes should be allowed; therefore, the vote
buyer or coercer would not know if the veriﬁed vote was the ﬁnal one. The main
disadvantage of this protocol is that it does not prevent vote manipulation at
server side. Additionally, anyone with access to the encrypted ballots, considered
to be part of the ﬁnal tally, can use them as a proof of vote since they can be
decrypted using the secret encryption keys kept by the voters.
The main disadvantage of this approach is that it requires the voter to have
access to two independent communication channels. Additionally, a veriﬁcation
step sometime after the vote casting procedure is not convenient for voters.
3 CodeVoting
We propose CodeVoting, a solution/system to prevent vote manipulation at
client side while allowing the use of cryptographic voting protocols to protect
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Fig. 2. CodeVoting components’ overview
the election’s integrity at server side. CodeVoting is a mix of the “special security
PC hardware” and “code sheet” approaches, cf. sections 2.2 and 2.5. Figure 2
presents an overview of the CodeVoting components.
CodeVoting proposes the use of a tamper resistant device without any human
I/O capabilities, the Voter Security Token (VST), to perform a cryptographic
voting protocol at client side and securely authenticate the voter, e.g. by means
of digital signatures. The voter communicates her/his choice to the VST using a
code sheet approach based on codes printed on a paper card, the CodeCard. The
CodeCard is generated directly by the VST, which prevents vote manipulation
by a malicious computer. On the other hand, as explained later, the VST also
provides a proof of the correct conclusion of the voting protocol.
Brieﬂy, our solution consists in the following steps: i) the voter expresses
her/his vote as a secret code, ii) the secret code is translated into the corre-
sponding candidate identiﬁer (ID) (clear vote), iii) the clear vote is used in a
cryptographic voting protocol, and iv) once a cryptographic proof of the correct
vote delivery is received, a successful vote delivery code is released to the voter.
3.1 Voter Security Token
The VST is the component in charge of the vote code translation to the clear vote
as printed in the CodeCard (Sec. 3.2). After the vote code translation it is possible
to use it in any voting protocol. The voting protocol runs inside the VST to pre-
vent any vote manipulation at client side. It is possible to use a cryptographic vot-
ing protocol to prevent vote manipulation at server side. Usually, cryptographic
voting protocols require the use of digital signatures to authenticate the voters.
We suggest the use of the VST to enable such authentication mechanism. The
VST should be protected by a PIN to prevent unauthorized access.
We propose to distribute the VSTs to the voters in a preliminary registration
phase. This procedure is only required once, i.e. the VST will be reused in
subsequent elections. To provide a secure voter’s authentication mechanism, by
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means of a digital signature, a public key infrastructure (PKI) should be in
place before the registration process. The PKI can be set up just for election
purposes or can be more widely used in a national e-Government project. This
last approach can be useful to prevent, at some level, vote buying and coercion,
because if the voter gives her/his VST to a vote buyer/coercer it is not just a
vote that the s/he gives away, it is also all the e-Government rights of the voter.
3.2 CodeCard
The CodeCard is nothing more than a paper card that associates each candidate
ID to a vote code printed on it. There should be one CodeCard per VST so
that every voter votes with diﬀerent codes. The voter should be the only one
with access to the codes printed on her/his CodeCard. Consequently, we have a
problem to solve: how to create the CodeCard, associate it with the VST and
give it to the voter without leaking the codes.
We propose to generate each voter’s CodeCard within the VST. This is a
viable option because the CodeCard becomes automatically associated with the
corresponding VST and no other entity besides the VST has access to the codes
on the CodeCard. However, we still have the problem of how to secretly print the
CodeCard, i.e. how to give it to the voter without leaking the codes. We believe
the best idea is to have a certiﬁed CodeCard printing machine, the CodeCard
generator interface (CCGI), available at the local authorities’ oﬃces. Since the
codes are generated inside the VST, the CCGI would be very simple. It would
consist of only an interface to the VST, e.g. a smart card reader, in the case of
using smart cards, a keypad (for inserting a PIN to unlock the VST) and a small
printer. We believe that such simple hardware could be easily certiﬁed and sealed
to ensure the secrecy of the codes printed. With a certiﬁed CCGI in all local
authorities’ oﬃces a voter can go to any local authority’s oﬃce and generate a
new CodeCard for her/his VST. For privacy reasons the CCGI should be inside
a private booth, similar to the ones used for traditional paper-based voting.
3.3 CodeVoting Details
CodeVoting can be seen as a rearrangement of the ideas presented by Chaum
[36]. However, the idea of CodeVoting is to only use the codes as a user interface
and not as the entire voting protocol. The secret codes are the base for the
secure communication channel between the voter and her/his VST. The voter
uses secret codes to choose her/his favorite candidate. Each VST has a set of
secret codes associated with it that are printed on a CodeCard.
For the voter, the voting process is quite simple. The voter just uses a Code-
Card to translate the candidate ID into a vote code. For instance, a voter, with
the ballot and CodeCard of Fig. 3, who wishes to vote for a candidate D only
has to enter WL764 as the vote code.
Every voter will have a diﬀerent CodeCard. Therefore, diﬀerent vote codes
exist for the same candidate. Each CodeCard is associated with a VST, which
is responsible for the translation of the vote code to the candidate ID. Only the
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Election for the most important
ﬁgure in security.
A - Alice
B - Bob
C - Eavesdropper
D - Attacker
Enter your vote code:
CodeCard
Candicate Vote Code
Blank Vote SIT5Y
A A3CR2
B 97RG7
C GHFT1
D WL764
...
Conﬁrmed vote delivery code:
6HKG2
Fig. 3. Example of a ballot (on the left) and a CodeCard (on the right)
voter and the VST should know the codes written on the CodeCard. Therefore,
CodeVoting is able to prevent a malicious voting application from changing the
voter’s vote. Note that there should also be a speciﬁc code for a blank or spoiled
vote to prevent the malicious voting application from easily casting such a vote.
After translating the vote code to the candidate ID, any voting protocol can
be used to cast the vote, e.g. a cryptographic voting protocol that protects the
election’s integrity at server side. When the VST receives a conﬁrmation of a
successful vote delivery from the election server, it releases the conﬁrmed vote
delivery code, assuring the voter that her vote was successfully delivered.
Based on the description of CodeVoting the reader can easily understand that
CodeVoting is a type of user interface plugin to a voting system that protects
the voter’s choice from manipulation.
Note that we do not use diﬀerent reply codes for each candidate. The reason
for this is simple, as explained in section 2.5, the code sheet approach oﬀers
no guarantees that the vote code is translated to the right candidate at server
side, i.e. the reply code only conﬁrms that the vote has reached an entity that
knows the right reply code. Therefore, the only advantage of using a diﬀerent
reply code for each candidate is that it makes it more diﬃcult for an attacker
to change the vote to a random candidate without being detected by the voter,
i.e. the attacker needs to get the correct vote and reply codes.
However, to avoid vote stealing, the length of the vote codes must be deﬁned
to prevent an attacker from guessing a valid vote code. Therefore, and from a
theoretical point of view, the use of a single reply code is enough to detect an
attacker trying to forge a successful vote delivery. Additionally, the use of only
one reply code reduces approximately by 13 the amount of information to be
printed on the CodeCard.
It is also important to note that CodeVoting is vulnerable to malicious applica-
tions that change the correspondence between the candidates and the candidates’
IDs. This vulnerability is due to the lack of secure output on the VST. However,
there are measures to prevent ballot modiﬁcation, such as i) publicly exposing
the ballot some time before the election, ii) forcing the sorting of the candidates
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on the ballot, and the corresponding candidate IDs, in a veriﬁable way, e.g. al-
phabetical sorting, and iii) using an image that is hard to forge/modify as a
ballot.
4 Evaluation
We argue that CodeVoting protects against vote manipulations at the voter’s PC
under the following assumptions: i) the VST performs the protocols correctly and
cannot be manipulated by the voter’s computer, ii) the CodeCard is generated
in a secure and controlled environment by the VST (the voter is the only person
there), iii) the voter keeps her/his CodeCard secret, and iv) the correspondence
between the candidate and its ID cannot be changed.
Under these assumptions, changing a vote to a predetermined candidate is
virtually impossible because the corresponding vote code is not known by the
attacker, and the Probability of Guessing the Correct Vote Code Pgcvc = 1365 ,
with 5 alphanumeric symbols, i.e. less than 1 in 60 millions. If we use both capital
and non-capital letters, we have Pgcvc = 1625 , i.e. less than 1 in 900 millions.
A random change attack has almost the same probability of success as the
previous attack. If we have n candidates, the Probability of Guessing a Random
valid Vote Code is Pgrvc = n.Pgcvc.
However, to prevent an easy denial of service attack the VST should not
automatically block when the voter inserts invalid vote codes. Therefore, this
limitation allows an attacker to perform a brute force attack to get a random
valid vote code. Such attack can be minimized through simple measures, such as
delaying the vote code veriﬁcation function, e.g. with a delay of three seconds the
attacker is limited to only 1200 tries in a one hour attack. Another possibility
for reducing the chances of success of a brute force attack is increasing the
domain of the vote codes, either by increasing the code length or by using more
symbols, e.g. capital and non-capital letters. For instance, by using 62 symbols,
the probability of a successful one hour brute force attack is 1 in 763444 for
5-digit codes, and 1 in more than 47 million for 6-digit codes.
The attacker can also try to manipulate the voter’s vote by fooling the voter
into believing that s/he has cast a vote, while in reality no vote was cast. To
prevent such an attack we propose the use of a code to conﬁrm the vote delivery.
The VST only releases this code after getting a conﬁrmation that the vote was
successfully delivered, e.g. it could be a message signed by the election server.
Therefore, if we use a conﬁrmed vote delivery code with the same length as
the vote codes, this attack has the same probability of success as the attack of
changing a vote to a predetermined candidate. The conﬁrmation received by the
VST can be stored inside it to provide a proof of vote delivery, therefore allowing
the voter to protest if her/his vote is not considered for the ﬁnal tally.
Another important aspect is CodeVoting in the face of vote buying/coercion
problems. CodeVoting allows the voter to produce a receipt of the vote by giving
away the CodeCard to an attacker prior to the election day. On election day, the
attacker can demand the voter to vote using a computer controlled by him/her,
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e.g. by using a web site that is controlled by him/her or a special program also
developed by the him/her. In this case, the attacker will have a vote receipt that
proves the voter’s vote, therefore enabling vote buying and coercion. We think
the best way to prevent such an attack is by using a voting protocol that allows
the voter to cast several votes, i.e. update her/his vote. We believe that the
possibility of a vote update in a machine which is not controlled by the attacker
would discourage vote buying and coercion attacks [8].
CodeVoting oﬀers protection against vote manipulation and allows the detec-
tion of malicious interference in the voting process. However, CodeVoting cannot
force a malicious computer to behave properly. Therefore, if any malicious inter-
ference in the voting process is detected, the voter should go to another computer
and vote again.
4.1 Is the VST Trustworthy?
CodeVoting relies on the correct behavior of the VST. Therefore one can ask:
CodeVoting is designed to protect the voter from the insecure voter’s PC, but
what guarantees are given that the VST does in fact do what it is supposed to
do? One way verify it is by testing the VST. Besides testing the VSTs in the
production phase, we believe that it would be good to have additional random
testing by an independent certiﬁcation authority.
Additionally, we can also make voters part of the certiﬁcation process. It
could be possible for a voter to verify her/his VST by running a fake election
with instant results sometime before the real election.
Nevertheless, one can point out that the application running inside the VST
is somehow able to detect that it is being subject to a test, and therefore will
act properly in the tests but will still change the voter’s vote on the real election
day. This scenario can be prevented if one is sure of the software running inside
the VST.
Fortunately, today there is secure tamper resistant hardware, such as smart
cards, that supports signed applications. Therefore, it is possible to use publicly
available and certiﬁed source code software. Of course, we can also have certiﬁed
applications running on a PC. However, since it is possible for an attacker to take
control of the voter’s PC, a signed application does not guarantee the correct
behavior. On the other hand, it is not possible to take control over secure tamper
resistant hardware, or at least it should be very diﬃcult even with specialized
tools and impossible with just a common computer such as the ones at our homes.
Therefore, a signed application running on secure tamper resistant hardware can
guarantee the correct behavior.
5 Matrix CodeVoting
The presented CodeVoting technique has some limitations. First, it does not
support large candidate lists, so its application is limited. Indeed, the CodeCard
must have an entry for each possible candidate. If we consider elections with
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a large number of candidates, let’s say above thirty, the size of the CodeCard
could start to become too large or usability problems may arise, e.g. due to small
fonts used.
Another issue is the CodeCard reuse. If a voter uses the same CodeCard in
more than one election, it is possible for an attacker to replace the voter’s vote
by a random one. To be able to do this, an attacker must collect the codes used
during the ﬁrst election. Additionally, the attacker must also be in control of
the PCs used by the voter to vote in each election. If the voter uses diﬀerent
PCs, it will be much harder to perform the attack. We can also make this attack
harder by executing the whole voting protocol inside the VST, without leaking
the voter’s identiﬁcation to the voter’s PC. Therefore, the diﬀerent PCs only
have the unlocking PIN to identify the voter.
Of course, the voter can always protect himself/herself against this type of
attack by getting a new CodeCard for his/her VST between elections. However,
an issue still remains: simultaneous elections. The simultaneous elections’ issue
is a particular case of the CodeCard reuse, in which the voter cannot go (or
is not convenient for him/her to go) to the local authorities and get a new
CodeCard. One solution that may work in some particular cases is the use of
sequential candidate IDs throughout all the simultaneous elections, e.g. instead
of using candidate IDs A and B for elections 1 and 2, use candidate IDs A and
B for election 1 and candidate IDs C and D for election 2. This simple candidate
numbering solves the problem of simultaneous elections but can lead to the large
candidate list issue.
Next, we present the details of the Matrix CodeVoting, an enhancement to
CodeVoting to support large candidate lists and, consequently, simultaneous
elections as previously explained. Additionally, it also provides better security in
the case of reuse of a CodeCard in consecutive elections. The Matrix CodeVoting
allows the use of the CodeVoting technique in elections with a large candidate
list by using an encryption matrix that stores a large number of candidate ID
transformations in a compact form.
5.1 Matrix CodeVoting Details
The Matrix CodeVoting replaces the original CodeCard by a Matrix CodeCard
(Fig. 4). The ballot format suﬀers minor changes and the candidates are identi-
ﬁed by numbers (e.g. 54598, 39027, etc.) instead of letters (e.g. A, B, C, etc.), as
illustrated in Fig. 5. The Matrix CodeCard consists in a matrix that the voter
will use to translate (encrypt) the candidate ID to the vote code, in opposition
to the direct associations printed in the original CodeCard.
Figure 6 shows how to use the Matrix CodeCard to get a vote code from
a candidate ID. In this example we use a 5-digit candidate ID which supports
100000 diﬀerent candidate IDs, a much larger number than the number of pos-
sible candidates with the ﬁrst CodeCard design. With the help of the Matrix
CodeCard the voter translates the candidate ID into a character string.
Of course, we still need to be careful when selecting the candidate IDs. For
instance, if we have nine candidates it is a bad idea to use candidate IDs from
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Matrix CodeCard
Candidate number d5 d4 d3 d2 d1
0 A S Q B U
E 1 W E P S I
n M 2 E W L V R
c a 3 R Q I G S
o t 4 Y U M N J
d r 5 V N H Y H
i i 6 B J T U T
n x 7 M M F K C
g 8 O X E W E
9 U T Z A P
Vote code v5 v4 v3 v2 v1
Conﬁrmed vote delivery code: 6HKG2
Fig. 4. Matrix CodeCard for 5-digit candidate numbers
Election for the most important
ﬁgure in security.
A - Alice
B - Bob
C - Eavesdropper
D - Attacker
Enter your vote code:
Election for the most important
ﬁgure in security.
54598 - Alice
39027 - Bob
78351 - Eavesdropper
46209 - Attacker
Enter your vote code:
Fig. 5. A regular ballot is presented on the left and the Matrix Code-Voting is shown
on the right
Candidate number 4 6 2 0 9
0 A S Q B U
E 1 W E P S I
n M 2 E W L V R
c a 3 R Q I G S
o t 4 Y U M N J
d r 5 V N H Y H
i i 6 B J T U T
n x 7 M M F K C
g 8 O X E W E
9 U T Z A P
Vote code Y J L B P
Fig. 6. Example of the encryption of a candidate ID using the Matrix CodeCard
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00001 to 00009. In this case, the vote code for all candidates only diﬀers in the
last digit; therefore, an attacker willing to change the voter’s vote to another
candidate would have a Probability of Guessing a Valid Vote Code Pgvvc = 825 ,
i.e. 32% of success in the ﬁrst try. This probability can be reduced by increasing
the domain of the vote codes, e.g. by using capital and non-capital letters. With
this example it is clear that the candidate IDs should be as diﬀerent as possible
to minimize the probability of an attacker guessing a valid vote code from the
one typed in by the voter, e.g. 02536, 63875 and other IDs where all digits in
the same positions are diﬀerent.
Table 1. Number of diﬀerent candidate IDs for 4 ≤ k ≤ 6 and candidate ID length
from 5 to 8. The results are an average of 100 rounds of random code generation.
Candidate ID Length
Security Parameter 5 6 7 8
k = 4 68 502 3483 25014
k = 5 - 65 387 2380
k = 6 - - 58 298
Since the candidate IDs are in base 10 it is only possible to have 10 candidate
IDs that diﬀer in all positions. We propose the adoption of a security parameter
k, which deﬁnes the number of diﬀerent digits between all candidate IDs. The
value of k must be chosen taking into account the probability of an attacker
guessing, at the ﬁrst try, a valid vote code from the one inserted by the voter.
i.e. Pgvvc = ( 1numberOfCodeSymbols−1 )
k.
In Table 1 we present the possible number of candidates for 4 ≤ k ≤ 6 and a
candidate ID length from 5 to 8. Table 1 shows that the Matrix CodeVoting is
able to securely support large candidate list elections by slightly increasing the
length of candidate IDs.
As explained before, the problem of simultaneous elections can be reduced
to a large candidate list problem. One hasty conclusion is to assume that if the
Matrix CodeVoting oﬀers a solution for elections with a large candidate list it
can be used to securely conduct simultaneous elections. We must say that this
is not entirely correct because if an attacker has access to diﬀerent vote codes,
generated with the help of the same Matrix CodeCard, it can correlate the codes,
discover parts of the matrix and possibly substitute the voter’s vote.
The minimum number of codes needed to expose the entire matrix is 11, i.e. if
a unique correspondence between the candidate numbers can be established only
through an analysis of the repeated digits in the codes. For instance, given two
simultaneous elections with the following pairs of candidates 12345, 67890 and
43567, 82059. A voter could vote for candidate 12345 in the ﬁrst election and
for candidate 82059 in the second election. Since the selected candidates are the
only ones that share the second digit, the vote client application automatically
has access to nine encrypted symbols in the encoding matrix, one in the column
of the shared digit and two in all the other columns.
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To minimize this threat it is important to choose candidate IDs in a way that
no repeated digits in the vote codes of diﬀerent elections can allow for a unique
correspondence between candidate IDs, i.e. making the vote code correlation
harder by adding confusion to the process.
Concluding, the Matrix CodeCard reuse should be limited to a few elections
to prevent successful correlation attacks.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
Cryptographic voting protocols protect voting from manipulation at server side,
if the protocol is executed by a trusted vote client. However, in remote voting,
e.g. Internet voting, the voters use uncontrolled platforms to vote, therefore there
are no guarantees that the client machine is trusted.
In this paper we presented the CodeVoting technique that protects the voter’s
vote from malicious manipulations at the uncontrolled/untrusted vote client
platform, e.g. the voter’s PC. CodeVoting uses a “code sheet” approach to pro-
tect the communication between a voter and a VST attached to the voter’s
PC. The VST runs a cryptographic voting protocol to protect the vote from
manipulation at server side.
We presented the ﬁrst code sheet format called CodeCard, that enables a
secure communication between the voter and her/his VST. However, this format
does not support elections with large candidate lists. Additionally, for improved
security, the voter should renew her/his CodeCard between elections. Then,
we introduced the Matrix CodeCard, a new CodeCard design that allows the
support of large candidate lists. The use of the Matrix CodeCard in consecutive
elections is also more secure.
In the future we want to enhance CodeVoting by introducing support for
multi-candidate selection and ordering.
At the moment, we have working prototypes of the CodeCard and the Matrix
CodeCard implemented in smart cards, namely JavaCards. We are now working
on the integration of the CodeCard prototypes with a fully cryptographic vote
client inside the VST (JavaCard).
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